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0. Introduction 
In his middle-period dialogues, Plato worked out at least the rough outlines of a 
distinctive theory of knowledge. According to the chronology that seems most plausible, 
he first sketched the outlines of this theory in Meno; then he revised and developed the 
theory further in Phaedo and the Republic; and finally, in Theaetetus, he probed the theory 
in depth, by subjecting it to a series of searching questions. In this essay, I shall propose 
an interpretation of the version of the theory that is presented in Phaedo and the 
Republic, although I shall also consider what seems to be the slightly earlier version of the 
theory that we find in Meno. Unfortunately, I shall not be able to pay more than the most 
glancing attention to Theaetetus. 
My interpretation will focus, as narrowly as possible, on Plato’s view on the question, 
“What is knowledge?” I shall touch only briefly on Plato’s views on related questions, 
such as “What is belief?” and the like. My interpretation of Plato’s view on this question 
will be at least in part conjectural: although I shall show that it fits much of the textual 
evidence, I shall not be able in the available space to check this interpretation against all 
the relevant textual evidence, nor shall I be able to argue in detail that this 
interpretation is preferable to all alternatives. The primary goal of this essay is just to 
put this interpretation forward for consideration. 
No contemporary scholar of ancient philosophy has studied Plato’s epistemology in 
greater depth than Gail Fine.1 The debt that my interpretation owes to her work is both 
obvious and immense. I shall admittedly disagree with her on one crucial point: I shall 
accept a version of the traditional interpretation of Republic 476e–480a, according to 
which what in that passage is called “knowledge” (epistēmē or gnōsis) consists in a kind of 
grasp of the Forms, whereas – at least typically – what in that passage is called “opinion” 
(doxa) consists in a kind of grasp of some perceptible concrete things. On many other 
points, however, I shall accept Fine’s interpretation. Moreover, I shall also follow her 
methodology – which involves not just the most rigorous philosophical analysis, based on 
a painstakingly close reading of the primary texts, but also an attempt to bring Plato into 
a dialogue with contemporary epistemologists, in a way that looks more for continuities 
between Plato’s thinking and that of our contemporaries than for contrasts or 
dissimilarities. While it is agreed on all sides that it is important to avoid anachronism, I 
strongly agree with Fine’s belief that a consideration of such contemporary ideas is often 
helpful in understanding Plato’s thought. 
Briefly, my interpretation of Plato’s theory of knowledge is the following. 
1. Plato is a kind of contextualist about words like ‘knowledge’. The heart of Plato’s 
theory is an account of four different levels of cognitive mental states, which he 
illustrates with the image of the four segments of the Divided Line (Republic 509d–
                                                          
1 See the papers collected in Fine (2003), and also Fine (2004 and 2008). 
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511e). But as Plato explicitly admits, sometimes he uses his principal term for 
“knowledge” (‘epistēmē’) to cover both of the upper two levels, and sometimes just for 
the highest level. There are also indications that his usage of other Greek words for 
‘know’ (such as ‘eidenai’ and ‘gignōskein’) and of the term ‘doxa’ (‘belief’ or ‘opinion’) 
varies with context as well. I shall explain the sense in which this makes Plato a 
contextualist below. 
2. Plato assumes that knowledge is a factive mental state, belonging to the inclusive 
genus of cognitive states that also includes all kinds of belief or opinion. As I shall 
argue, one distinguishing feature of knowledge, in his view, is that it must satisfy the 
condition that contemporary epistemologists call “adherence”. Indeed, he may think 
that genuine knowledge must satisfy adherence to the highest degree – that is, in 
effect (as I shall explain), genuine knowledge must be utterly indefeasible. If he does 
think this, it would explain why he also holds that all genuine knowledge is a priori – 
which, he speculates, is best explained by the Theory of Recollection. 
3. It is also plausible that Plato thinks that every truth that can be known is necessary. 
Together with the explanation of knowledge that is based on the Theory of 
Recollection, this guarantees that genuine knowledge also satisfies the condition that 
contemporary epistemologists call “safety”. Indeed, knowledge is safe to the highest 
degree – that is, infallible. If, as seems plausible, Plato assumes that all truths that are 
necessary in this way are in some sense aspects of the Forms, this vindicates the 
traditional interpretation that he holds that all genuine knowledge consists in a grasp 
of some aspect of the Forms. 
4. For Plato, knowledge always requires at least some grasp of the explanation of the 
truth that is known. The truth about the Forms constitutes an intelligible explanatory 
system of necessary truths; and the different levels of knowledge correspond to the 
different degrees to which the thinker grasps this explanatory system of necessary 
truths. It may be that all adult human beings have at least a rudimentary grasp of 
some fragments of this system of these necessary truths. But no human being has yet 
achieved the highest level of knowledge, which would consist in a coherent synoptic 
grasp of the whole system of necessary truths. 
5. We can use our understanding of Plato’s terminology to show how the texts support 
this interpretation. As Plato admits, he switches between using ‘epistēmē’ strictly, to 
refer to the highest level of cognition, and using it more loosely, to refer to both of 
the two upper levels together. In some other dialogues, he uses ‘doxa’ as a generic 
term for the genus of which all four levels are species; but in the Republic, he mostly 
uses ‘doxa’ for mere belief – a cognitive mental state that falls short of counting as 
“epistēmē” – though what this means depends on how in turn the term ‘epistēmē’ is 
being understood. Moreover, Plato sometimes allows himself to use some of the Greek 
words for ‘know’ (such as ‘eidenai’ and ‘gignōskein’ and their cognates) in an idiomatic 
sense, to stand for what in fact, according to his official theory, is just a true belief of 
a relatively reliable kind (in his terminology, confidence or pistis). 
In what follows, I shall take these five points in turn. 
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1. Plato’s contextualism 
There are two famous passages where Plato contrasts knowledge and opinion: Meno 98a, 
and Republic 476e–480a. But later in the Republic, this duo of contrasting states is 
elaborated into a quartet, when Plato gives an account of four different levels of 
cognitive state, illustrating these states by the image of the four segments of the Divided 
Line (509d–511 e). The names that he gives to these four states there are: intellection 
(noēsis), thought (dianoia), confidence (pistis), and imagination (eikasia). 
It is natural to wonder how the pair discussed earlier (knowledge and opinion) is related 
to the quartet that is discussed later (intellection, thought, confidence, and imagination). 
Plato answers this question explicitly, in a slightly surprising way, in a passage in the 
middle of the description of the education of the guardians in Book VII. In this passage, 
Socrates contrasts “dialectic” – which is his name for the highest form of intellectual 
inquiry – with five other branches of learning (namely, arithmetic, the two-dimensional 
geometry of planes, the three-dimensional geometry of solids, astronomy or the four-
dimensional geometry of motion, and harmonic theory), and makes the following 
comment about these other branches of learning (533d–534a):  
From force of habit, we have often called these branches of learning kinds of 
“knowledge”. But they need another name, clearer than “opinion” and darker 
than “knowledge”. We defined it as “thought” somewhere before. But I don’t 
suppose we will dispute about names, with matters as important as these before 
us to investigate. … 
It will be satisfactory, then, I said, to do as we did earlier and call the first portion 
“knowledge”, the second “thought”, the third “confidence”, and the fourth 
“imagination”. The last two together we call “opinion”, while the first two we call 
“intellection”. Opinion is concerned with becoming; intellection with being. And 
as being is to becoming, so intellection is to opinion; and as intellection is to 
opinion, knowledge is to confidence and thought to imagination. 
Here Plato clearly characterizes both the two lower levels (confidence and imagination) 
as species of “opinion” (doxa). This characterization would be pointless if doxa were in 
fact a wide genus that included all four levels of cognition. So this is one of the passages 
in the Republic where he uses the term ‘doxa’ for mere belief – that is, for a kind of 
cognition that falls short of knowledge. 
However, he also explicitly admits that his terminology is not invariant between 
different contexts: he says that earlier he called both of the two upper levels kinds of 
“knowledge” (epistēmē), though here he now prefers to use this term more strictly, so 
that it refers only to the uppermost level. Moreover, without explicitly taking note of the 
fact, he also switches around his use of the term ‘intellection’ (‘noēsis’) as well. When he 
gave the image of the Divided Line at the end of Book VI (509d–511 e), he used the term 
‘intellection’, not to refer to the upper two levels together, but just to refer to the highest 
level alone. Here, however, in Book VII, he explicitly uses the term ‘intellection’ for both 
of the two upper levels together. So, in effect, Plato has switched around the terms 
‘intellection’ (noēsis) and ‘knowledge’ (epistēmē) between the discussion of the Divided 
Line in Book VI and this later passage at 534a. It is clearly more charitable for us to 
interpret this switch as deliberate, rather than as a mere slip on Plato’s part. 
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By switching his terminology around in this way, Plato seems to be warning us against 
assuming that the same word always expresses the same concept and refers to the same 
entity. On the contrary, we need to look at the underlying structure of the concepts that 
are being expressed, and not just at the terminology that is being used. Fundamentally, 
there are these four levels of cognition, which following Fine (1990) I shall refer to as L1, 
L2, L3, and L4; and there are also the various genera to which these four levels of 
cognition belong. Our fundamental task as epistemologists is to understand these 
different species and genera of cognitive states, not to worry about the terminology that 
we use to refer to them. 
With respect to the terminology itself, however, Plato is in a sense a contextualist. In 
different contexts, he uses cognitive terms like ‘epistēmē’ to refer to different mental 
conditions – sometimes using the terms to refer a more restricted condition, which 
includes only L4 (the highest level of cognition), and sometimes to refer to a more 
inclusive condition, which includes both L3 and L4 (the upper two levels) together. We 
shall later see evidence that he also uses the other Greek words for ‘know’ (such as 
‘eidenai’ and ‘gignōskein’) in a similarly flexible way as well. 
Admittedly, the text does not definitively establish whether Plato is a full-fledged 
contextualist, like such contemporary philosophers as Keith DeRose (2009), among 
others. To be such a full-fledged contextualist, he would have to think that cognitive 
terms like ‘epistēmē’ are not ambiguous, but have a single univocal meaning, and that in 
using the terms so that their extension shifts between contexts in this way, he is using 
the terms strictly in accordance with this univocal meaning. In other words, according to 
contextualism, it is part of the univocal meaning that cognitive terms like ‘epistēmē’ have 
that their extension shifts between contexts in this way. Nonetheless, the text is at least 
compatible with Plato’s being a contextualist in this full-fledged sense; and so I have 
taken the liberty of referring to Plato’s flexible use of this cognitive vocabulary as 
“contextualist”. 
Finally, it is also fairly clear that Plato’s use of the term for “belief” or “opinion” (‘doxa’) 
varies with context as well. Sometimes, as at this point in the Republic, he uses it for mere 
belief – that is, for the kind of belief that falls short of counting as knowledge. But in 
other contexts, he uses it more broadly for the genus of which all four levels are species. 
This seems to be the usage that we find in the second half of Theaetetus, where both of the 
two definitions that Plato considers – that knowledge is true belief (187b), and that it is 
true belief accompanied with an account (201c–d) – clearly imply that knowledge is a 
species of belief. 
On the relation between knowledge and belief, it is not Plato’s view but only his 
terminology that changes between Republic and Theaetetus. In both works it is assumed 
that there is a wider genus of cognitive states, and that both knowledge and mere belief 
are species of this wider genus. The only difference in the terminology is that sometimes 
(as in Theaetetus) Plato uses the word ‘doxa’ for the wider genus, and sometimes (as in the 
Republic) Plato restricts the word for the species of belief that falls short of knowledge. 
We shall return to this understanding of Plato’s terminology in the last section, when we 
survey some of the evidence for and against the interpretation that will be defended 
5 
here. As we shall see, this understanding of Plato’s terminology will help us to evaluate 
this evidence in a more precise and discriminating way. 
2. Adherence, indefeasibility, and the a priori 
Towards the end of Meno, Socrates makes the following suggestion about the difference 
between knowledge and mere true belief (97e–98a): 
True opinions are also a fine thing and altogether good in their effects so long as 
they stay with one, but they won’t willingly stay long, and instead run away from 
a person’s soul, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by 
reasoning out the explanation. And that is recollection, Meno my friend, as we 
agreed earlier. And when they’ve been tied down, then for one thing they become 
items of knowledge, and for another, permanent. And that’s what makes 
knowledge more valuable than correct opinion, and knowledge differs from right 
opinion by being tied down.  
Here, Plato suggests that knowledge differs from mere true opinion because true 
opinions “run away”, while knowledge is “permanent”. According to Bernard Williams 
(1978, 38), this suggestion should not be interpreted as the “the blankly psychological 
proposition (in any case, surely, very dubious) that one is more disposed to forget what 
one merely believes than what one knows”. Instead, it should be interpreted as the 
“point … that knowledge cannot rationally be rendered doubtful” – whereas mere beliefs 
can be “rationally rendered doubtful”. For a belief to be “rationally rendered doubtful”, I 
assume, is for the belief to be given up because it is rationally undermined or defeated. Let us 
also assume that in all the cases that concern us, the belief in question will be given up if 
and only if (and because) it is rationally undermined. In effect, then, the suggestion is 
that knowledge (unlike mere belief) cannot be rationally undermined. 
Williams interprets this suggestion as implying that knowledge “cannot” be rationally 
undermined. This interpretation is plausible – at least on some understanding of ‘can’. 
Plato is presumably not suggesting merely that knowledge is “permanent” in the same 
way as a belief that by a strange fluke just happens never to be undermined. Instead, the 
suggestion is that whereas with mere beliefs, it could easily happen that these beliefs are 
rationally undermined, it could not easily happen that any genuine knowledge is 
rationally undermined. To say that it could “easily happen” that a belief is undermined is 
to say that there are possible worlds that are sufficiently similar to the actual world (in 
the relevant respects) in which the belief is undermined.  
Presumably, when a belief is rationally undermined, it is undermined by new 
information or new reflections. There seem to be two ways in which this could happen: 
1. The true belief might have been unjustified all along, and the new information or 
reflections might prompt the believer to think more rationally, and to give up the 
belief. 
2. The true belief might originally have been rational and justified, but the new 
information might defeat that original justification. 
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Cases of the first kind (1) are true beliefs that were never justified at all; such cases were 
never cases of justified true belief (JTB). Cases of the second kind (2), however, involve a 
JTB whose justification is later defeated. According to Plato, the fact that the belief “ran 
away” or was rationally undermined in this way shows that it was never a piece of 
knowledge in the first place. Thus, if we agree with Plato’s judgment on cases of this 
second kind, we must conclude that they are cases in which a JTB fails to count as 
knowledge – or in the terminology that has become common after the work of Edmund 
Gettier (1963), they are “Gettier cases”. 
However, these cases are importantly different from the cases that were originally 
discussed by Gettier (1963). In each of the original Gettier cases, the believer might easily 
have had a belief, in a very similar way to the way in which the believer actually believes 
the particular proposition in question, even if the proposition that the believer would 
then have believed were false. As many contemporary epistemologists would say, the 
belief in question fails to be safe.2 
The problem with cases of type (2) is different: it is not that the believer might too easily 
have believed something false; it is that the justification of the belief in question might 
too easily have been defeated. Thus, the closest parallel to the cases that Plato has in 
mind are cases like the “assassination case” that was first presented by Gilbert Harman 
(1973, 143f.). In this case, there is a JTB that fails to count as knowledge, because there is 
a mass of (misleadingly) defeating evidence in the believer’s environment, and it is 
simply a fluke that the believer does not encounter this defeating evidence. But this 
defeating evidence – we may suppose – consists entirely of “undercutting” (rather than 
“rebutting”) defeaters. So if the thinker had encountered this defeating evidence, she 
would simply have given up on having any beliefs about the topic in question: she would 
not have come to believe the proposition’s negation.  
In other words, this belief fails to count as knowledge, not because the believer could too 
easily have come to believe something false, but because the belief could too easily have 
been rationally defeated even if it were true. That is, on this approach, for you to know p, 
there must be no possible world that is sufficiently similar to the actual world, in which p 
is true, but your belief in p is rationally defeated or undermined. 
This condition on knowledge is broadly akin to the fourth of the four conditions that were 
imposed on knowledge by Robert Nozick (1981, 176–8) – the condition which has more 
recently come to be known as “adherence”.3 For a thinker’s belief in a true proposition p 
to “adhere” to the truth is for the belief to be such that, in all the relevantly similar 
possible worlds in which the proposition p is still true, the thinker would still believe p. 
In effect, this idea of a belief’s “adhering” to the truth across the relevantly similar 
possible worlds seems equivalent to giving an explicitly modal gloss on Plato’s talk of the 
belief’s being “permanent”. 
                                                          
2 For seminal discussions of the idea that knowledge involves safety, see Sainsbury (1997), Sosa 
(1999), and Williamson (2000). 
3 For a systematic discussion of adherence, see Bird (2003). 
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It is clear that a belief in a proposition p can be safe without adhering to the truth in this 
way. This will happen whenever there is no relevantly similar world in which the 
corresponding belief that the believer has is false, but there is a relevantly similar world 
in which although p is true, the believer encounters misleading undermining evidence, 
and so does not believe p in that world. 
What adherence requires, then, is that there must be no relevantly similar worlds in 
which the thinker encounters misleading undermining evidence in this way. Now, the 
term ‘relevantly similar’ as it appears in this statement of adherence is presumably a 
context-sensitive term: in some contexts, the term might have an inclusive extension, so 
that many worlds count as “relevantly similar”; in other contexts, the term might have a 
more restricted extension, so that many fewer cases count as “relevantly similar”. 
Depending on how inclusive the term’s extension is, the adherence condition will vary in 
strength. At one extreme, it might in effect be the condition that there is no possible 
world whatsoever in which the thinker encounters such misleading defeating evidence. At 
the other extreme, it might merely be the condition that the thinker does not in fact 
encounter such misleading defeating evidence in the actual world. In between these 
extremes, adherence requires that the thinker should encounter no such misleading 
defeating evidence in a range of possible worlds besides the actual world, but not that the 
thinker should encounter no such defeating evidence in any possible world whatsoever. 
There is no evidence that Plato is aware of this issue with the interpretation of 
adherence. However, it may be that, at least implicitly, he interprets adherence as the 
strongest of these conditions – that is, as the condition that there is no possible world in 
which the thinker’s knowledge would be rationally undermined, or in other words, as the 
condition that knowledge is indefeasible. If all genuine knowledge is indefeasible in this 
way, then this would guarantee that all genuine knowledge must satisfy adherence to the 
highest degree. 
If Plato does assume that all genuine knowledge is indefeasible in this way, then this 
could explain one of the most striking claims that he does seem to make – the claim that 
all genuine knowledge is a priori. Most philosophers would accept that all of our empirical 
justification for beliefs about mind-independent reality is defeasible; there is always the 
possibility of new experiences that would defeat any such empirical justification. So, on 
this assumption, if any knowledge about mind-independent reality is indefeasible, that 
knowledge must be a priori. 
There is much textual evidence in favour of interpreting Plato as regarding all genuine 
knowledge as a priori. First, in Meno (81d) he declares that “seeking and learning are in 
general recollection”; and at 86b, he seems to treat “what we happen not to know at 
present” as the same as “what we do not remember”. There are many controversial 
issues surrounding the interpretation of the Theory of Recollection, but it is clear that 
when we “recollect” something, we in some way “retrieve” a truth that is already 
contained within the soul. In this sense, recollected knowledge is not derived from our 
sensory experience of the external world; it is knowledge that we possess purely by 
exploiting the resources that are already, antecedently to sensory experience, contained 
within the soul. In other words, it is a priori. 
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Another passage where Plato insists on the a priori character of genuine knowledge is in 
Phaedo (65a–66e). For the attainment of wisdom (phronēsis), the bodily senses are said to 
be a positive “hindrance” (65a). Sight and hearing and the other bodily senses “hold no 
truth”; and when the soul attempts to inquire into anything with the body, it is “utterly 
deceived” (65b). Instead, it is “through reasoning that any of the things that are become 
manifest” to the soul (65c). He seems to equate this kind of reasoning with thinking 
(dianoeisthai, 65e); and he says that the truth of these things is not seen through the body, 
but it is whoever of us who has prepared himself for thinking most fully and precisely of 
each object of inquiry itself who would come closest to knowing (gnōnai) each thing (65e). 
Finally, the prominence of mathematics and philosophy in Plato’s conception of 
knowledge also encourages the conclusion that he thought that all genuine knowledge is 
a priori. Admittedly, there are some striking passages where he seems to allow for 
knowledge of truths – such as the road to Larissa (Meno 97a) – that would be knowable 
only empirically if at all; we shall return to the issue of how to understand these passages 
in Section 5 below. But the general picture that seems to emerge is that the paradigmatic 
examples of knowledge are mathematics and philosophy – which are plausibly taken to 
be a priori. 
To sum up, according to Plato, knowledge is a factive cognitive state, which (a) adheres to 
the truth, and (b) is a priori – perhaps because it must adhere to the truth to the highest 
degree, or in other words, must be completely indefeasible. 
3. Necessity, safety, and the Forms 
How could it be that all the truths that we ever come to know are already contained 
within the soul itself, waiting to be recollected? This is never fully explained in Meno, but 
it seems to have something to do with the fact that the soul is imperceptible, immaterial, 
and eternal (existing for all of time – past, present, and future), and so in some way 
“akin” to the Forms, as Plato argues at length in Phaedo (78b–80c). It also seems that the 
Forms collectively are the source of an intelligible system of necessary truths, which 
somehow articulates the nature of the Forms. So, presumably, one of the main ways in 
which the soul is “akin” to the Forms is in somehow reflecting this system of necessary 
truths. This explains why all knowable necessary truths about the nature of the Forms 
are somehow built into the nature of the soul itself – even though, for most of the time, 
at least while we live an embodied human life on earth, these truths are inaccessible to 
consciousness (or as Plato suggests, have been forgotten). 
How exactly can we retrieve these truths that are built into the soul itself? Some 
philosophers might propose that we can sometimes retrieve such necessary truths 
though a kind of inference: perhaps one can sometimes “recollect” a truth p by means of a 
process of inference whose conclusion is p. But this proposal would suffer from the 
following defect. The capacity for knowledge-yielding inferences of a certain sort is itself 
a mental state that has a certain kinship with the knowledge that those inferences are 
valid. So this capacity would itself demand explanation – and the explanation of how we 
possess this capacity will itself have an affinity to the explanation of how we know the 
very necessary truths that are in question. So any explanation based only on the appeal 
to such a capacity for inference is superficial, and fails to get to the heart of the matter. 
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At all events, Plato’s account of how recollection works is not just based on such an 
appeal to inference. When Socrates interrogates the slave in Meno (82b–85b), what 
happens seems just to be that Socrates asks the slave a question, and then the correct 
answer to the question pops up in the slave’s head. By asking these questions, Socrates 
gets the slave consciously to focus on certain propositions. So Plato’s picture seems to be 
this: for at least some of these necessary truths, when we consciously focus on these 
truths, we immediately come to understand and know them. This seems to be suggested 
by his remark (Republic 508d) that “when the soul focuses on something illuminated by 
truth and what is, it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding…”. In 
other words, given that these truths are already built into the soul, sometimes simply 
focusing consciously on these truths is sufficient for “recollecting” them. 
As I understand it, this account of what it is to “recollect” a truth does not appeal to any 
kind of “direct acquaintance” with the truth in question. Instead, the account appeals to 
truths that are buried deep in unconscious propositional memory, and then awoken into 
conscious knowledge. A perceptual reading of Platonic recollection would be quite 
misguided. (Indeed, it may be that one of the chief functions of recollection is to explain 
our capacity for inferring necessary truths. As I shall tentatively suggest in the next 
section, Plato may think that whenever recollection provides us with any kind of 
knowledge, what we recollect is never a single truth all by itself, but rather an argument, 
which involves both certain premises and a conclusion that follows from them.) 
It is part of this account of how a priori knowledge is possible that it is knowledge of 
aspects of the Forms – that is, of necessary truths. There is no hint anywhere else in 
Plato’s middle-period writings of any other account of how a priori knowledge might be 
possible. So it seems plausible that Plato held not only that all genuine knowledge is a 
priori, but also that it is all knowledge of necessary truths. This necessitarianism about 
knowable truths is inherited by Aristotle, who argues in the Posterior Analytics I.33 
(88b30–89b9) that the knowable truths are always necessary truths, while the objects of 
“opinion” (by which Aristotle means mere opinion, the kind of belief that falls short of 
being knowledge) are contingent propositions – or as Aristotle puts it, “what is true or 
false but can also be otherwise” (89a3).4 
I have already suggested that Plato may think that genuine knowledge must be 
indefeasible, and so satisfy the “adherence” condition to the highest possible degree; at 
least, this would provide one possible explanation of why he thinks that all genuine 
knowledge is a priori. This raises the question of whether he also thinks that knowledge 
must satisfy safety to the highest degree. For a belief to satisfy safety to the highest 
degree would be for it to be impossible to have a belief in a false proposition on any basis 
that is similar to the basis of the belief in question. In that sense, for a belief to satisfy 
safety to the highest degree is for it to be based on an infallible basis for the belief in 
question. (It is striking that at 477e, Plato says that knowledge is “infallible” – 
anamartēton – although there are admittedly several possible interpretations of that term 
in this context.) As we have seen in considering the Theory of Recollection, whenever 
anyone has genuine knowledge of a truth, Plato would say that the basis for this 
                                                          
4 See the interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the distinction between knowledge and belief 
that is given by Fine (2010). 
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knowledge is precisely that the truth in question was already built into the knower’s 
soul. So, for a belief that has a basis of this sort to be maximally safe, it would have to be 
impossible for any false proposition to be built into the soul in this way. 
If the only truths that can be built into the soul in this way are necessary truths that 
constitute aspects of the Forms, then it will be impossible for any false proposition to be 
built into the soul in this way. So, if Plato accepts the sort of necessitarianism about 
knowable truths that I have described, then he would in effect be committed to the 
conclusion that all genuine knowledge satisfies safety in the highest degree. 
The view that Plato accepts this sort of necessitarianism about knowable truths is also 
supported by the traditional interpretation of the Republic according to which it argues 
that all knowledge concerns the Forms. As Socrates says at 529b–c: 
I can’t conceive of any branch of learning that makes the soul look upward except 
that which concerns what is and what is invisible, and if anyone attempts to learn 
any of the sensible things, whether by gaping upward or squinting downward, I’d 
claim – since there’s no knowledge to be had of such things – that he never learns 
anything…. 
In this passage, the reference to “what is and what is invisible” is clearly a reference to 
the Forms, while “sensible things” – that is, perceptible concrete things – are explicitly 
said to be unknowable. As I shall argue later in this section, the same point – that the 
“objects” of knowledge are the Forms – is also made in the famous passage at the end of 
Book V (476d–480a). 
It is not immediately clear what it might mean to say that the “objects” of knowledge are 
Forms. Plato uses a variety of different expressions to capture this idea of the “object” of 
a cognitive state. Often, he uses the preposition ‘epi’, apparently in the sense of towards or 
in reference to. For example, he says that “knowledge” (gnōsis) is “towards what is” (477a), 
that opinion is “positioned towards something else” (477b), and that the person who has 
an opinion “bears the opinion towards something” (478b) – although he also uses phrases 
without ‘epi’, as when he says, “We had to assign ignorance to what is not, and knowledge 
to what is” (478c). 
It would be a mistake, I think, to identify the “object” of these cognitive states, which 
Plato is trying to indicate with these phrases, with the content of the state that is 
indicated by the noun clause that is the grammatical direct object of the cognitive verb. 
Instead, I propose, Plato is trying to offer an explanatory analysis of the cognitive state: 
he is suggesting that the state is ultimately or fundamentally explained by a kind of 
cognitive connection with or grasp of this “object”. 
However, just because the “object” of these cognitive states is an entity like a Form or a 
perceptible concrete thing, it does not follow that these states do not also have 
propositions as their contents: the “object” of the state may be distinct from its 
propositional content. In fact, Plato is perfectly happy to fill in his specifications of pieces 
of knowledge by noun clauses that indicate propositions, as when he says that 
“knowledge (epistēmē) is by nature towards what is, to know how it is (gnōnai hōs esti)” 
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(477b).5 So, it seems plausible that Fine (1990) was right to argue that the kind of 
knowledge under discussion here is ordinary propositional knowledge. 
Thus, on the interpretation that I am proposing, according to Plato all the propositional 
knowledge that one has is fundamentally explained by one’s having a kind of cognitive 
connection with or grasp of the Forms. Since it also seems that both the existence and 
the intrinsic character of the Forms are metaphysically necessary, if one knows a 
proposition solely because of having an appropriate kind of cognitive connection with 
the Forms, that proposition would be surely have to be a necessary truth. Thus, if I am 
right to accept a version of the traditional interpretation of the end of Book V, according 
to which the “objects” of knowledge are the Forms, and the “objects” of opinion are 
perceptible concrete things, this passage supports the conclusion that all genuine 
knowledge for Plato is knowledge of necessary truths. 
By contrast, on my interpretation, according to Plato all belief or opinion is explained by 
some kind of cognitive connection with or grasp of concrete perceptible things. The idea 
here may be that all opinion is ultimately explained by some kind of sensory experience, 
which Plato may view as essentially consisting in a kind of cognitive connection with 
concrete perceptible things. It is clear why all the beliefs that we would regard as 
empirically justified would in his view be explained by sensory experience. But he may 
also have thought that even those beliefs that we would regard as irrational or 
unjustified are best explained by the thinkers’ somehow misreading or being misled by 
their sensory experiences. (Perhaps even beliefs in necessary falsehoods – like Meno’s 
slave’s initial belief that the square whose sides are double in length is also double in area 
(82e) – are also in Plato’s view explained by sensory experience.) 
What reason is there for accepting this interpretation of the end of Book V? Clearly, one 
of the passage’s main goals is to explain the difference between three cognitive 
conditions – knowledge, ignorance, and opinion – in terms of a corresponding difference 
in their “objects”.6 It seems clear that these three cognitive conditions are understood to 
be disjoint: no particular token state can be an instance of more than one of these three 
types. Ignorance is clearly disjoint from both knowledge and opinion: to be ignorant of a 
certain domain is to be cognitively connected to nothing in that domain (478b–c) – this is 
the sense in which the “object” of ignorance is “what is not”. In this way, being ignorant 
of a domain excludes both having opinion and having knowledge within that domain. 
Since the term ‘opinion’ in this passage seems to refer to “mere opinion”, no token state 
can be both a state of knowledge and a state of “opinion” – that is, a cognitive state that 
falls short of knowledge. It follows that these three kinds of cognitive condition are 
disjoint. 
Since Plato seems to be aiming to explain the differences between these three types of 
states in terms of corresponding differences between their objects, the sets of the objects 
                                                          
5 Admittedly, the exact interpretation of this sentence is disputed. But on any plausible 
interpretation, the clause that I have translated ‘how it is’ (hōs esti) indicates that it is part of the 
knowledge in question that it in some way involves predicating or describing its object – that is, 
in effect, it involves a proposition. 
6 In this way, Plato’s approach is parallel to the way in which Aristotle in De Anima II.6 (418a6–25) 
explains the differences between the different senses by identifying the different “special 
objects” of the senses. 
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of these three types of state would also have to be equally disjoint. The set of the objects 
of ignorance would have to be the empty set, since as we have seen, being ignorant about 
a domain involves being cognitively connected to nothing within that domain; and every 
pair consisting of the empty set and any other set is disjoint. Since the Forms and the 
perceptible concrete things are also disjoint non-overlapping sets, one way to interpret 
the passage as identifying three disjoint sets for each of these three cognitive conditions 
would read it as identifying the empty set for ignorance, the set of Forms for knowledge, 
and the set of perceptible concrete things for opinion. 
Ultimately, however, there is a simpler and more powerful reason for accepting a version 
of the traditional interpretation of this passage. As we have seen, Plato claims that 
knowledge has as its object, or is “towards”, “what is” (477a); in a parallel way, he 
concludes, opinion has as its object, or is “towards”, what is “intermediate between what 
purely is and what in every way is not” (478e). The text (479a–c) also seems to make it 
clear that Plato identifies (a) what is with the Forms (for example, as Plato says, “the 
Beautiful itself”), which are delighted in and loved by the philosophers, and (b) what is 
intermediate between what is and what is not with the concrete perceptible things (as he 
says, “the many beautiful things”), which are delighted in by the “lover of sights and 
sounds”. The conclusion that Plato draws at 480a, apparently making the very same use 
of the preposition ‘epi’ as earlier at 477a–b, is that the “objects” of knowledge are the 
Forms (like “the Beautiful itself”), while the “objects” of opinion are the perceptible 
concrete things (like “the many beautiful things”). 
So shall we say that the latter (i.e. the philosophers) delight in and love the things 
that knowledge is towards, while the former (i.e. the lovers of sights and sounds) 
delight in and love the things that opinion is towards? 
It is admittedly far from clear exactly what Plato means by saying that perceptible things 
are “intermediate between what is and what is not” (478d–e). It may have to do with the 
fact that the existence and character of perceptible things is contingent, and so every 
such thing exists and has a certain intrinsic character in one possible world, and either 
does not exist or does not have that intrinsic character in another world. But at all 
events, the important point for our purposes is that in this passage he endorses the view 
that the “objects” of knowledge are the Forms. As I have explained, what this seems to 
mean is that all genuine knowledge is ultimately explained by our cognitive connection 
with or grasp of the Forms, and so must be knowledge of metaphysically necessary 
truths. 
In this way, then, it seems to me that a version of the traditional “Two Worlds” (TW) 
interpretation of Plato’s theory of knowledge is correct. Several objections have been 
raised against this TW interpretation – and especially by Fine (2003). I shall consider 
these objections to the TW interpretation in Section 5 below. 
4. Explanation and the levels of knowledge 
So far, it seems as if Plato is defending an extreme conception of knowledge, according to 
which all knowledge must consist in a priori knowledge of necessary truths – perhaps 
because all knowledge must be both indefeasible and infallible. So how can it also be 
that – as I have claimed – Plato is also a kind of contextualist about knowledge? 
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The answer is that Plato also thinks that knowledge must meet a further condition. This 
condition is in a way analogous to the “justification” condition that later epistemologists 
imposed on knowledge. It is the condition that knowledge requires a grasp of the 
explanation of the truth that is known.7 The point that knowledge must satisfy this 
condition is made at several points. In Meno (98a), it is said that knowledge is “tied down 
by reasoning out the explanation” (aitias logismōi); in Phaedo (76b), it is said that “a man 
who has knowledge would be able to give an account of what he knows”; in the Republic 
(534b), it is said that the person who cannot give an account “to that extent” (tosouton) 
lacks understanding (nous) concerning the thing in question; and in Theaetetus (201c—d), 
the suggestion that knowledge is “true belief accompanied by an account” seems to be 
treated as the most promising of the accounts of knowledge under consideration. 
Some contemporary contextualists like Stewart Cohen (1999) hold that justification 
comes in degrees, so that it is only the context in which the term ‘know’ is used that 
determines how much justification a person needs for a proposition for it to be true to say 
in that context that the person “knows” the proposition. In an analogous way, as I shall 
argue, Plato thinks that there are levels of knowledge, where each of these levels 
corresponds to the degree to which the person grasps the explanation of the truth that is 
known; and in different contexts words like ‘know’ can be used more or less strictly. 
When the term is used less strictly, it refers to all levels that involve any degree of grasp 
of the explanation of the truth that is known; but when the term is used more strictly, it 
refers only to the highest degree of grasping this explanation. 
Plato’s account of the different levels of knowledge is made most explicit in his 
discussion of the Divided Line (Republic 509d–511e). Strictly speaking, this analogy is only 
part of an extended discussion, the overall goal of which is to convey the central role of 
the Form of the Good both in knowledge and in reality. Unfortunately, I will not be able 
to explore the role of the Form of the Good in any detail; I shall simply focus on what this 
passage tells us about the nature of knowledge. 
As we have seen, the four segments of the line correspond to two different kinds of 
opinion – imagination (L1) and confidence (L2) – and two different kinds of knowledge –
thought (L3) and intellection (L4). In interpreting the distinction that is drawn here 
between these two levels of knowledge (L3 and L4), it seems best to assume that both 
levels of knowledge satisfy all the conditions on knowledge that I have identified so far: 
that is, both levels of knowledge involve a priori knowledge of necessary truths. Similarly, 
both levels of opinion (L1 and L2) involve beliefs, which are fundamentally explained by 
sensory experience – which Plato seems to regard as consisting in a kind of cognitive 
connection with concrete perceptible things.  
Plato’s account of the analogy at 509d implies that the four segments of the Divided Line 
have certain proportions to each other. Let the lengths of the four line-segments be, 
respectively, l1, l2, l3, and l4. Plato tells us explicitly that the following three ratios are all 
the same: l1/ l2 = l3/ l4 = (l1 + l2) / (l3 + l4). 8 It follows by elementary algebra that l2 = l3. It is in 
                                                          
7 For a revealing exploration of this point, see Burnyeat (1980).  
8 This interpretation is clearly supported by Plato’s use of the phrase ‘ton auton logon’ at 509d5; it 
does not matter whether we follow the Oxford Classical Text in reading ‘anisa’ at 509d4 or the 
various ancient and modern critics who have suggested amending the text to ‘an’ isa’. 
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my judgment preposterously implausible to suggest that Plato might somehow have 
failed to notice this simple mathematical fact. Moreover, even if – quite unaccountably – 
Plato himself failed to notice this fact, there were plenty of brilliant mathematicians at 
the Academy who would have pointed it out to him. So it seems to be an important 
feature of this image that the length of the line-segment that represents confidence (L2) 
is equal to the length of the line-segment that represents thought (L3). 
Most scholars hold that it is also part of Plato’s image that the divisions of the line are 
unequal. In other words, the ratio in accordance with which the line is divided (l1 + l2) / 
(l3 + l4) ≠ 1, and in consequence, l1 ≠ l2, l3 ≠ l4 and (l1 + l2) ≠ (l3 + l4). It is not totally clear what 
these unequal divisions are meant to convey. But one reasonable speculation is that it is 
meant to indicate that opinion (that is, L1 and L2 together) – in the sense of mere opinion, 
the kind of belief that falls short of knowledge – is inferior to knowledge (L3 and L4 
together), and that in a similar way, imagination (L1) is inferior to confidence (L2), and 
thought (L3) is inferior to intellection (L4). Since as we have seen, the line-segment that 
represents confidence (L2) is equal in length to the line-segment that represents thought 
(L3), what seems to be suggested is that confidence (L2) is not inferior to thought (L3) in 
the way in which opinion in general is inferior to knowledge in general. In short, there is 
a “good kind of belief” and a “second-rate kind of knowledge”, and neither of the two – at 
least as Plato now thinks of things in the Republic – is inferior to the other. 
The distinction between imagination and confidence is sketched extremely briefly in the 
discussion of the Divided Line. On the whole, however, the view of many commentators 
seems plausible: imagination (L1) is a state that involves uncritically taking sensory 
experiences at face value, without any deployment of an ability to discriminate between 
reliable and misleading appearances; confidence (L2), on the other hand, is a state that 
involves some deployment of a reliable discriminatory ability of this sort.9 
In fact, it seems clear that the same distinction is explained again much later, in Book X 
(602c–603b), when Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief that are involved when 
we see something that “looks crooked when seen in water and straight when seen out of 
it …” (602c). Cases of this kind, he argues, reveal that there are two kinds of belief -- 
clearly implying that both kinds involve a part of the soul’s “believing” something 
(doxazon). It seems plausible to me that Plato’s reason for implying that the superior kind 
of belief in these cases counts as belief, rather than as knowledge, is because its content 
is a contingent fact about concrete perceptible items, rather than on necessary truths 
about the Forms. 
The inferior kind of belief is the one that uncritically takes sensory appearances at face 
value; this kind of belief is attributed to an “inferior” part of the soul (603a). The other 
kind of belief somehow “places confidence in measurement and calculation” (603a); 
because it “places confidence” in such measurement and calculation it is attributed to 
the “best part of the soul”. It is striking that Plato uses the term ‘pisteuon’ for ‘places 
confidence’ – a term that is obviously cognate with the term that he uses for the L2 kind 
of belief, ‘pistis’. This makes it plausible that this superior kind of belief is what was 
                                                          
9 This is in effect how Fine (1990) interprets the distinction. 
15 
earlier called confidence (pistis): that is, it is a belief about contingent concrete things 
that involves a reliable ability to discriminate veridical from misleading appearances. 
Presumably, exercising this ability will often involve a sort of “measurement” or 
“calculation”. Such measurement or calculation presumably involves some application of 
mathematical reasoning to concrete perceptible things; this sort of reasoning would 
presumably only be possible for those who possess at least some degree of knowledge (if 
only the lower L3 kind of knowledge, thought). 
The distinction between the two levels of knowledge is explained in somewhat greater 
detail. The lower kind of knowledge is illustrated in the Republic (510c–d) by the examples 
of the kinds of mathematics that had been developed in Plato’s time. We know from Meno 
that this sort of mathematics (even the very rudimentary grasp of this sort of 
mathematics that Meno’s slave achieves in the course of his discussion with Socrates) 
involves recollection: the soul consciously focuses on certain necessary truths, and 
because these necessary truths about the Forms are already built into the soul, the soul 
comes to have a priori knowledge of those truths. What Plato says here is that L3-level 
knowledge (thought) has two limitations compared to L4-level knowledge (intellection). 
First, even though it is concerned with abstract mathematical objects, it still makes use of 
concrete visible objects as images (this point is made three times, at 510b, 510d and 
511a). Secondly, it cannot avoid relying on “hypotheses” instead of on the ultimate 
“unhypothetical” explanatory first principle (510b–c and 511a–b). 
The first point might seem puzzling: if L3-level mathematical knowledge really is a priori 
knowledge of necessary truths, why does it still use perceptible things as “images”? It 
seems that Plato must be assuming that while we are only at this level of knowledge, we 
still need images of this sort – such as figures and diagrams and the like – to focus clearly 
enough on the relevant truths in order to recollect them. (It seems clear that in his 
discussion with Meno’s slave, Socrates draws diagrams in order to help the slave to focus 
on the relevant questions.) By contrast, if we ever acquired complete L4-level knowledge 
of the whole intelligible system of truths, then we would somehow be able to focus on 
each of these truths without any such reliance on images. It is because of this feature of 
L3-level knowledge that it still has some kinship with opinion: although it is a state that 
is fundamentally explained by the soul’s cognitive connection to the Forms, it still has a 
kind of dependence on the soul’s connection to perceptible concrete particulars. 
The second difference between L3-level and L4-level knowledge concerns the degree to 
which the thinker grasps the explanatory system of necessary truths. L3-level knowledge 
involves relying on “hypotheses” and deriving “conclusions” from such hypotheses, but 
failing to provide any “further” explanation of these hypotheses. Presumably, these 
“hypotheses” and “conclusions” are themselves necessary truths that belong to the 
whole explanatory system of necessary truths that flow from the nature of the Forms. So, 
whenever we have any level of a priori knowledge of these necessary truths, we must 
grasp at least a small argument in which some of these truths are “hypotheses” and 
others are “conclusions” that logically follow from them. 
If you grasp an argument in which a true conclusion follows from some true hypotheses, 
you can be said to have at least some grasp of an explanation of this conclusion. But if you 
cannot derive these hypotheses from any “further” principles, you have no “further” 
explanation of these hypotheses. This raises a problem about how you can be said to 
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“know” these hypotheses, given that (as we have seen) Plato insists that to know a truth, 
one must have some grasp of its explanation. The solution to this problem proposed by 
Fine (1990) seems plausible to me: there is still a sense in which I grasp a kind of 
explanation of these hypotheses, since these hypotheses are in a way explained by their 
explanatory power in relation to the truths that follow from them. 
So L3-level knowledge involves grasping at least a small argument involving these 
necessary truths, and so having a limited though genuine insight into the explanation of 
the truths in question. L4-level knowledge, by contrast, involves a complete grasp of the 
whole explanatory system of necessary truths, including the ultimate “unhypothetical 
first principle of everything”, which Plato seems to identify with the Form of the Good.10 
To achieve L4-level knowledge, a few one-off bits of recollection would not be sufficient. 
One would have to use what Plato calls “dialectic” (511b) in order to fit all of these 
recollected truths together in the right way, and thereby to achieve a grasp of the whole 
explanatory system of necessary truths. 
It seems clear that Plato thinks that anyone who has any grasp of mathematics at all has 
L3-level knowledge, while L4-level knowledge has perhaps never yet been achieved by 
any actual human being. This reveals that it is in a way an oversimplification on Plato’s 
part to write as though there were exactly two levels of knowledge. If one’s grasp of this 
explanatory system of necessary truths comes in degrees, there is a huge indeterminate 
number of levels of knowledge, extending all the way from the most rudimentary grasp 
of tiny fragments of the explanatory system of truths through intermediate levels to a 
comprehensive grasp of the whole system. 
Indeed, there is some – admittedly somewhat equivocal – evidence that Plato thinks that 
virtually everyone possesses at least certain very elementary kinds of L3-level knowledge. 
When the argument for the Theory of Recollection is presented in Phaedo (72e–77a), it 
starts out from the assumption, which is enthusiastically accepted by Simmias, that “we 
know what the Equal itself is” (74b) – where the phrase “the Equal itself” clearly refers to 
the Form of the Equal. However, Simmias explicitly denies having the kind of knowledge 
of the Equal itself that would involve being able to give an account of it “properly” (axiōs, 
76b); we may take this as the claim that Simmias does not have L4-level knowledge of the 
Form of the Equal.11 
Nonetheless, with respect to the L3-level knowledge of the Equal itself that Simmias does 
have, Socrates and Simmias seem to agree that he got that knowledge from perceiving 
concrete perceptible objects like “equal sticks and stones” (74b), and that we have been 
having the relevant kind of perceptions “from the very moment we were born” (75b). 
The implication seems to be that Simmias started to acquire the kind of knowledge of 
what the Equal itself is that he actually has not long after he started having perceptions 
of this kind. This kind of knowledge may be plausibly identified with a possession of the 
concept of equality. So it may be that for Plato, certain particularly elementary pieces of 
L3-level knowledge are necessary for even possessing the basic mathematical concepts 
that we have; and since the other examples of Forms that he cites in Phaedo and the 
Republic are the Forms of ethical qualities like the Good and the Just and the like, Plato 
                                                          
10 For an illuminating discussion of Plato’s conception of the “unhypothetical”, see Bailey (2006). 
11 For a seminal discussion of this part of Phaedo, see Ackrill (1997, Essay 1). 
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may also think that certain rudimentary pieces of L3-level knowledge are also necessary 
for possessing the fundamental ethical concepts too.12 
At all events, we know that even Meno’s untutored slave recollects certain necessary 
mathematical truths; in so doing, according to the theory that Plato develops in Phaedo 
and the Republic, the slave recollects certain aspects of the Forms – certain small 
fragments of the complete intelligible system of necessary truths. According to the 
interpretation of this theory that I am proposing here, in recollecting these truths, the 
slave acquires some rudimentary pieces of L3-level a priori knowledge of necessary 
truths. But the kind of grasp of mathematical truth that the slave achieves in this passage 
is, of course, as Plato presumably knew, fairly widespread. So, on my interpretation, at 
least some basic pieces of L3-level knowledge are widespread. 
Some readers may think that this implication of my interpretation – that according to 
Plato, some rudimentary forms of a priori knowledge of necessary truths are widely 
shared – is incompatible with the view, which Plato seems to endorse, that non-
philosophers are “in reality deprived of knowledge of each thing that is” (Republic 484c). 
However, it is open to me to interpret this occurrence of the word ‘gnōsis’ (‘knowledge’) 
as referring to something like L4-level knowledge. This is one example of a pattern that I 
shall explore in more detail in the following section: once we understand the flexible way 
in which Plato uses his terminology, the apparent obstacles to my interpretation will 
disappear. 
5. Cognitive terms in context 
In this final section, I shall try to show how my interpretation of Plato’s theory and of his 
use of terminology can explain some puzzling features of the relevant texts, and also 
answer some of the key objections that are raised against my interpretation. 
First, we can now see why in Phaedo, Simmias seems to contradict himself on the issue of 
whether people like him have knowledge of Forms like the Equal itself – with Simmias 
saying at 74b that “we know what the Equal itself is”, and clearly implying at 76b that he 
does not know what the Equal is. In the first passage, Simmias is referring to rudimentary 
L3-level knowledge, while in the second passage, he is referring to complete L4-level 
                                                          
12 This interpretation of this passage in Phaedo is emphatically denounced by Dominic Scott 
(1999), who claims that it involves Plato in “appalling difficulties” (114); according to Scott, 
“recollection only starts with the process of philosophizing, and thus only a rather limited 
number of people recollect” (96). However, Scott’s arguments are not persuasive: his suggestion 
that only philosophers recollect seems incompatible with the indisputable point that according 
to Plato, Meno’s untutored slave recollects certain truths of mathematics before Socrates’ and 
Meno’s eyes; the kind of grasp of elementary mathematics that the slave achieves is certainly not 
confined to philosophers. Scott regards it as an “absurdity” (106) to read Plato as claiming that 
any ordinary thinkers are aware of the way in which ordinary concrete perceptible objects “fall 
short” of the Forms. But in fact, it is not implausible to suggest that, at least at the time when he 
wrote Phaedo, Plato believed that even Meno’s slave is implicitly aware of the difference between 
a necessary truth (like the theorem that the square on the diagonal is double the area of the original 
square) and any contingent truth about the perceptible diagram before him; and this implicit 
awareness of this difference is, I suggest, precisely what Plato means by speaking of our 
awareness of how concrete perceptible objects “fall short” of the Forms. 
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knowledge. So there is no contradiction between these statements when they are 
correctly understood. 
As I have explained, my account of Plato’s theory of knowledge is a version of the 
traditional TW interpretation. I shall now address some objections to the TW 
interpretation. One such objection that might be raised is that Plato’s ontology is not in 
fact divided into just two worlds – the world of the Forms and the world of perceptible 
concrete things. There are other items in his ontology – most notably, souls, which as we 
have seen are “akin” to the Forms in being imperceptible and eternal, but are clearly not 
themselves identical to Forms, like the Equal itself or the Beautiful itself. 
In fact, however, this point is quite consistent with my version of the TW interpretation. 
My argument for this interpretation only needs the assumption that the Forms and the 
concrete perceptible things constitute disjoint sets of items: the two sets do not need to be 
exhaustive as well as disjoint. Moreover, on my version of this interpretation, Plato’s 
claim that the Forms are the “objects” of knowledge and concrete perceptible things the 
“objects” of belief does not imply that beliefs can only be about concrete perceptible 
things. It implies that all our beliefs are ultimately explained by our sensory experiences, 
which consist in a cognitive connection to such concrete perceptible things. As I shall 
explain, this allows for both knowledge and beliefs about the soul. 
First, there are presumably some necessary truths about the soul as such, which can be 
known a priori (for example, it seems that according to Plato, we can know a priori that 
the soul is immortal). These beliefs are explained by our cognitive connection with the 
Forms (presumably including the universal Form of the Soul as such). Secondly, our 
beliefs in any contingent truths (and in any false propositions) about souls must in 
Plato’s view be ultimately explained by sensory experiences – which consist in a kind of 
cognitive connection with concrete perceptible things. So Plato is committed to the view 
that all beliefs in contingent truths (and in false propositions) about souls are in this way 
empirical. Admittedly, this view is not obviously correct; but it certainly does not seem 
obviously wrong either. 
At one point, Fine (1990) enumerates five objections to the TW interpretation. I shall now 
defend my interpretation against these five objections. First, Fine (1999, 215) objects that 
according to the TW interpretation, “the objects of knowledge and belief are … disjoint; 
one cannot move from belief to knowledge about some single thing.” On my 
interpretation, however, the “object” of a belief must be distinguished from the belief’s 
content. So, in principle, one could have an unjustified belief in a necessary truth – which 
would be ultimately explained by one’s sensory experiences, which consist in one’s 
cognitive connection with perceptible concrete things – and then move from this 
unjustified belief to knowing the truth. 
In addition, one can also move from L3-level knowledge to L4-level knowledge of a 
necessary truth, and from L1-level belief to L2-level belief in a contingent truth. As we 
have seen, in some texts, Plato uses the term ‘doxa’ as a generic term for the genus of 
which all four levels are species. So when we are using the term ‘doxa’ in this way, it will 
be correct to describe someone who moves from L3 to L4 as moving from a kind of doxa to 
epistēmē. In Meno, the slave’s recollections of mathematical truths are described as 
“beliefs aroused in him in a dream-like way” (85c). In the Republic, these dream-like 
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beliefs – since they are the results of genuine recollection, and so explained by the slave’s 
cognitive connection with the Forms – would have to count as L3-level cognitive states, 
of an elementary and rudimentary kind. It is certainly possible in Plato’s view to move 
from L3-level beliefs of this kind to L4-level knowledge. 
Secondly, Fine (1999, 215f.) objects that the TW interpretation implies that Plato 
“radically rejects the Meno’s account of knowledge, according to which true beliefs 
become knowledge when they are adequately bound to an explanatory account. For the 
Meno, knowledge implies true belief; on TW, knowledge excludes true belief.” However, it 
is only when the term ‘doxa’ is used in the narrower way, to refer to L1 and L2 taken 
together, that it excludes knowledge. When it is used in the broader way, it refers to the 
genus of which all four levels are species. When the term ‘belief’ is used in the larger 
sense, knowledge – even according to the Republic – does not exclude true belief. Thus, 
my version of the TW interpretation is entirely compatible with Meno’s account of 
knowledge. 
The reader may suspect that the TW interpretation conflicts with Meno’s account of 
knowledge in a different way. The TW interpretation restricts knowledge – strictly so 
called – to a priori knowledge of necessary truths, explained by our cognitive connection 
to the Forms. But in Meno, one of the examples that Plato gives, seemingly as one of the 
centrepieces of his discussion of knowledge, is the case of someone’s knowing the road to 
Larissa (97a). But the truth about which road leads to Larissa is evidently a contingent 
truth (if the bridges and tunnels had been built in different locations, the road in 
question might not have led to Larissa at all), and it is also a truth that can surely only be 
known empirically. 
In fact, however, if we analyse the dialectical context of this example, it is not clear that 
Plato does commit himself to the assumption that one can genuinely know the road to 
Larissa. At this point, Socrates is raising an objection to the premise that he invoked 
earlier that “only someone with knowledge (phronimos) can guide correctly”. Proponents 
of this premise will presumably accept that it is possible to “guide” travellers to Larissa; 
and so proponents of this premise are committed to the assumption that it is possible to 
know the road to Larissa. But Socrates rebuts this premise by pointing out that one can 
also guide correctly if one has mere correct belief (97b). So, Socrates need not accept the 
assumption that anyone can genuinely know the road to Larissa: for Socrates, it is an 
entirely live possibility that the only condition that ever enables anyone to guide 
travellers to Larissa is mere correct belief, and not knowledge. The most that Socrates 
need accept – purely for the sake of argument – is that if anyone (perhaps per impossibile) 
knew the road to Larissa, then they would be able to guide travellers successfully. So, 
when read carefully, the text of Meno does not commit Plato to recognizing the 
possibility of anyone’s knowing the road to Larissa.13 
                                                          
13 At one point in Theaetetus (201b6), Socrates seems to presuppose – at least for the sake of 
argument – that an eyewitness can know (eidenai) the truth “about what happened to people who 
have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence”. In this way, it seems to 
me that in Theaetetus, Plato is exploring the possibility of broader conception of knowledge than 
the one that he developed in Republic and Pheado. 
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Thirdly, Fine (1999, 216) objects that the TW interpretation implies that “Plato is quite 
sceptical about the limits of knowledge; … no one can know items in the sensible world.” 
Fundamentally, this point is correct: according to my version of the TW interpretation, 
no one can know any contingent truths at all – including contingent truths about the 
sensible world. However, the difference between L1 (imagination) and L2 (confidence) – 
that is, between the inferior and superior levels of belief – is of great importance to Plato. 
An L2-level belief flows from the deployment of a reliable ability to distinguish between 
misleading and veridical appearances; if such a belief is also true, it is at least fairly close, 
if not identical, to what contemporary reliabilists like Alvin Goldman (1986) would 
categorize as full-blown knowledge. It is not surprising, then, that algebraically the ratios 
of the segments of the Divided Line suggest that L2-level belief is in no way inferior to L3-
level knowledge. So Plato is not denying that we can have reliably true beliefs about the 
sensible world. This hardly makes him into a radical sceptic about our cognitive relations 
with the sensible world. 
Fourthly, Fine (1999, 216) objects that “this sceptical result would be quite surprising in 
the context of the Republic, which aims to persuade us that philosophers should rule, 
since only they have knowledge, and knowledge is necessary for good ruling. If their 
knowledge is only of Forms – if like the rest of us, they only have belief about the sensible 
world – it is unclear why they are specially equipped to rule in this world.” However, it 
seems that mathematical knowledge can underwrite an ability for “calculation and 
measurement”, and one of the main ways in which someone can acquire an ability for 
reliably discriminating between misleading and veridical appearances is by having such 
an ability for calculation and measurement. In other words, having L4-level 
mathematical knowledge will help the philosopher-kings to have good L2-level beliefs 
rather than bad L1-level beliefs. So this is why those who have knowledge of necessary 
truths are better equipped to rule in the world of contingent sensible things. Still, it is 
unfortunately true, in Plato’s view, that beliefs about contingent concrete things can 
never be infallible in the same way as a priori knowledge of necessities. But Plato 
explicitly accepts this. This is why in the end the kallipolis will decline, when the 
philosopher-kings (in spite of their knowledge of all the necessary truths) form some 
mistaken beliefs about contingent perceptible matters (546b–c). So, Plato’s restriction of 
genuine knowledge to a priori knowledge of necessary truths is not surprising in the 
context of the Republic. 
Finally, Fine (1999, 216) objects that “the text of the Republic seems to contradict TW. At 
506c, Plato says that he has beliefs about, but no knowledge of, the Form of the good; and 
at 520c he says that the philosopher who returns to the cave will know the things there, 
i.e. sensibles.” The first point is easy for my account to handle. When Socrates says at 
506c that he has doxa without epistēmē, he is using the term ‘doxa’ in its broad sense, to 
refer to the genus of which all four levels of cognitive states are species, and he is using 
‘epistēmē’ in its narrow sense, to refer to L4 (intellection) alone. The point of this passage, 
then, is that Socrates has some kind of doxa (perhaps an elementary form of L3-level 
awareness) of the Form of the Good, but that this falls far short of the kind of L4-level 
knowledge that the philosopher-king would have. 
The second point is less easy for my version of the TW interpretation to handle. But Fine 
(2008) has herself emphasized that in the Apology Plato uses some of the Greek cognitive 
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verbs for knowledge (such as ‘eidenai’ and ‘gignōskein’ and their cognates) in an idiomatic 
way, to refer to what by the lights of Plato’s official theory is only a reliably true belief – 
that is, an L2-level belief (confidence or pistis). It seems plausible to me that something 
similar is happening with Plato’s use of these terms in the Republic as well. If L2-level 
beliefs are not in fact inferior in value to L3-level knowledge, it is not too misleading for 
Plato sometimes to use these terms in this idiomatic way. 
With the term ‘epistēmē’ and its cognates, there are a couple of passages where Plato 
seems to use these terms in other idiomatic senses. First, these terms sometimes refer to 
expert know-how – that is, to an expert’s knowledge of how to do something. We find this 
usage in a couple of places, especially in Republic IV: first, in an ironic passage at 420e 
(“We know how to order the farmers to be clothed in purple and gold…”); then at 422c 
(“the rich have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of warfare”); and, finally, 
in the passage where Socrates defines what it is for the city to be wise (428c–e), which 
moves, in a way that is reminiscent of the early Socratic dialogues, from speaking of 
knowledge of the crafts of building and metal-working and farming, to speaking of the 
knowledge that enables the guardians to deliberate about what is good and bad for the 
city as a whole. Secondly, a more specialized idiomatic use of the verb ‘epistasthai’ refers 
to knowing a text or a story by heart, as when Socrates says that he knows Aesop’s fables 
by heart (Phaedo 61b), or asks Glaucon whether he knows the beginning of the Iliad by 
heart (Republic 392e). Otherwise, however, in the middle-period dialogues, the term 
‘epistēmē’ and its cognates seem to refer principally to some level or other (according to 
context) of a priori knowledge of necessary truths.14 
In these ways, I propose, we can answer Fine’s objections to the TW interpretation. The 
TW interpretation is much less outré than generally supposed. Plato’s goal in classifying 
cognitive states is to “carve at the joints” (as he puts it in Phaedrus 265e). In his view, the 
distinction between a priori knowledge of necessary truths and our somewhat-reliably 
true beliefs about contingent matters marks a crucial “joint” – that is, a crucial 
dissimilarity between two different kinds of cognitive states. He is willing to allow that in 
ordinary language we use terms like as ‘eidenai’ and ‘gignōskein’ to refer to the latter as 
well as the former; and in some contexts, he is willing to slip into that form of speech too. 
But what is of fundamental importance to him is not what terminology we use, but the 
essential nature and differences between these different kinds of cognitive states. 
My fundamental conclusion, however, is that Fine is right on the most important point of 
all. Plato is not concerned with utterly different questions from contemporary 
epistemologists, nor is he defending a fantastic pre-modern theory that nowadays no one 
                                                          
14 This is especially clear of the occurrences of ‘epistēmē’ and its cognates in Phaedo 73c, 74c, 75e, 
and 76d. I would read the occurrences of these terms in Meno 85c and Republic 426d and 522c–d as 
referring to a priori knowledge of necessary mathematical truths, and the occurrences in Meno 
93b, Republic 409b, 505a, 536a, and 579e as referring to a priori knowledge of necessary ethical 
truths. (Nothing about Plato’s own views of knowledge can be inferred from Phaedo 96b or 
Republic 488d or 598c, since in these passages these terms appear in direct or indirect speech, 
expressing views that Plato rejects.) 
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could take seriously. He is brilliant and insightful epistemologist, with whom we can still 
have a productive dialogue today.15 
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